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Abstract
Has popular support for the operation and outcomes of a market economy permeated the population
outside of Moscow?  Does the next generation of Russian policy makers and business leaders hold views
consistent with a competitive market economy? Using the questionnaire employed by Shiller et al (1991), a
survey of Russian university students in mid-1999 takes a first step in answering these questions.  The
primary focus here is on whether there is evidence of popular support in Russia for: (1) private property /
property rights, (2) prices adjusting to surplus and shortage conditions, (3) payment for services rendered
or expenses incurred, (4) free enterprise, profit motive and rewards to successful business, (5)
performance-based pay, and (6) taking a financial risk for future reward by investing in productive
capacity.  Probit regression results indicate significant differences between the opinions of Russian and
American university students regarding market foundations and market outcomes.  These survey results
suggest that where significant differences emerge between Russians and Americans, the differences are
likely to contribute to undermining the effective operation of a market economy in Russia.  In some
instances where significant differences between Russians and Americans emerge, these are driven by
gender differences in Russia that are not matched in the U.S.  In comparison to the 1990 survey results,
there tends to be less support for market conditions and outcomes in the 1999 survey.
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JEL: O571
Are Russians Really Ready for Capitalism?
In January 1992, Russia announced a program intended to establish a market economy in relatively
quick order (Voprosy ekonomiki 1993).  Price liberalization and mass privatization formed the cornerstone
of the reform effort, and, much in the Soviet tradition, “storming” defined the construction style used to
build the requisite market-oriented infrastructure and institutions.
1   By 1995, Russian and Western policy
makers and scholars, alike, proclaimed the success of establishing a market economy in Russia.  Economic
conditions from 1992 to the present, however, have deteriorated for the majority of the Russian population
by almost every measure of well-being (Barberia et al 1997, Cox et al 1997, Klugman 1997, Goskomstat
1999, UNDP 1998 1999).  Unlike other transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, 50% of
Russia’s population lives below the income poverty line; 30% of the population is not expected to survive
to age 60 (UNDP 1999).  Despite privatization and market-based pricing, manufacturing output in 1999
remained less than half of the 1990 level, cargo transport has fallen steadily, as has the stock of fixed
capital assets and the overall size of the population (Goskomstat 1999).  The objective reality in Russia,
nearly a decade after the initiation of the transition from plan to market, stands in marked contrast to the
anticipated gains associated with adopting capitalism.
                                                
1 Berliner (1957) described storming, shturmovshchina, as the intensive work at the end of a planning
period to fulfill the plan and receive the bonus.  This characteristic was documented in the Soviet economy in the
1980s, as well (Gregory and Stuart 1990, Linz 1988 1989), despite the well-known quality reduction consequences. 2
Explanations for Russia’s poor economic performance abound, including failure to adopt stringent
macroeconomic stabilization policies, “crony capitalism,” obsolete capital and technology,  corruption
(including the siphoning-off of international aid to private off-shore bank accounts),
2 under-developed
communication and transportation infrastructures, predominance of monopoly power, lack of appropriate
legal and banking/financial institutions, among others.  While ample evidence to support each of these
explanations is readily available, the focus here is on the extent to which popular attitudes toward free
market operations and outcomes are impeding the transition to capitalism in Russia.
At the end of 1980s, it was not unusual to find articles in the Soviet press and scholarly journals
devising schemes for transforming all or part of the planned economy.  A recurring theme at the time was
the lack of understanding or support among the general population regarding market operations and
outcomes, compounded by obstacles imposed by well-placed bureaucrats, which impeded any progress
toward successfully introducing market relations on a broad scale in the Soviet economy.  Shiller et al
(1991) questioned the extent to which lack of understanding or support for market operations and
outcomes among the general population was in fact imposing an obstacle to change.  Surveying several
hundred Muscovites in 1990, and comparing the response patterns to those obtained from a similar number
of New Yorkers, the authors conclude a “remarkable similarity between many of the Soviet and American
results” (p.  399).
Has popular support for the operation and outcomes of a market economy permeated the
population outside of Moscow?  Does the next generation of Russian policy makers and business leaders
hold views consistent with a competitive market economy?  Using the questionnaire employed by Shiller et
al (1991), a survey of Russian university students in the spring of 1999 takes a first step in answering these
questions.  For comparative purposes, the questionnaire also was administered to a similar number of
university students in the United States.  Using a control group enhances the validity of the results by
                                                
2 Estimates by Russia’s national police agency, the MVD, put the amount of money illegally leaving Russia
each year at $9 billion, with total capital flight running more than $15 billion per year.  Altogether, it is estimated
that $350 billion in capital has been removed from Russia since December 1991.  Transition (August 1999), p. 11.3
permitting identification of significant differences in response patterns emerging from Russia’s transition
economy from those associated with a developed market economy.  
The primary focus here is on whether there is evidence of popular support in Russia for the
following dimensions of a market economy: (1) private property/property rights, (2) prices adjusting to
surplus and shortage conditions, (3) payment for services rendered or expenses incurred, (4) reward for
hard work or performance-based pay, (5) free enterprise, profit motive and rewards to successful business,
and (6) taking a financial risk for future reward by investing in productivity capacity.  While certainly not
exhaustive, the variables are quite comprehensive in terms of coverage of important elements in a market
economy.  Moreover, using the Shiller et al questionnaire permits comparisons, albeit imperfect, with
response patterns generated before the transition to capitalism began in Russia.
Section 1 describes the sample and methodology used in this study.  In particular, the rationale for
using university students is explained, as is the procedure for evaluating whether response patterns
between Russians and Americans are significantly different.  Sections 2-7 present the results, several of
which are noteworthy. 
First, in most instances where significant differences emerge between Russians and Americans, the
differences are likely to contribute to undermining the effective operation of a market economy in Russia. 
For example, Russians attach a much higher probability than do Americans to the potential nationalization
of business, as well as to the potential for government to confiscate savings.  Russians are much less likely
than Americans to be in favor of flexible prices, and much more likely to be in favor of rationing or
government control over prices. 
Second, in some instances where significant differences in response patterns emerge between
Russians and Americans, these are driven by gender differences.  In particular, there are more differences
between Russian men and women than there are between American men and women.  This is not
surprising, since market conditions have predominated in the United States much longer than in Russia. 
Ignoring these differences may be problematic for policy makers serious about introducing a market
economy in Russia: women account for at least 60% of the total population, and represent an even greater4
proportion of the over-40 population (Goskomstat 1999).  Combined with the fact that life expectancy is
rising for women, while notably falling for men for several years, in absolute numbers as voters and as
economic agents, women will be contributing more to Russia’s future than men.   
Third, in some instances, gender is more important than country in explaining the results.  For
example, in both countries:  (1) women are more likely than men to be bothered by someone taking a place
at the front of the line, even though their relative position in line does not change; (2) women are more
likely than men to want to settle accounts when expenses are shared among friends; (3) women are less
likely than men to support a program that pays high wage differentials to skilled or hard working
individuals.  While gender differences were not investigated in the previous study (Shiller et al 1991),
adopting appropriate polices to facilitate Russia’s transition may hinge upon incorporating such
information.
Finally, there tends to be less support for market conditions and outcomes among the university
students outside of Moscow who were surveyed in 1999 than among Muscovites surveyed in 1990.  That
is, for the same questions, there are more significant differences between Russians and Americans in 1999
than in 1990, especially in those areas that may undermine the successful operation of a market economy. 
In part, this may be driven by the locations included in the two surveys.  Numerous studies show a
significant capital city effect with regard to the pace of transition in Russia.
3 
Section 8 provides concluding remarks.
I.  Sample description and methodology
Are popular attitudes toward market outcomes, as well as attitudes toward the foundations of a
market economy, imposing an obstacle to the introduction of and ongoing functioning of capitalism in
                                                
3 Indeed, Moscow has been likened to the Disneyland of Russia with regard to transition outcomes.  While
Muscovites might tend to be supportive of market outcomes, their experiences and conditions tend not to reflect the
broader population of Russia (see Ellman 1994, Hanson 1996, Lehman et al 1999, Linz and Krueger 1996, for
example).5
Russia?
4  Does the generation of Russians “coming of age” during the transition process support the
objective of building a fully-functioning market economy?  Information that leads to a greater
understanding of current perceptions of market operations and outcomes helps to bridge the gap between
assumptions and reality regarding popular support for capitalism in Russia.  In this study, the null
hypothesis is that Russians’ attitudes are no different than those found among a similar population in the
United States. 
                                                
4 Hedlund (1999) argues that a deeply rooted rule aversion, as well as elaborate schemes to evade rules and
the lack of appropriate market institutions, may explain “the long string of discouraging events that have played out
in Russia following the start of ‘reforms’ in January 1992 ...” (p. 17).6
University students were selected as the target group for methodological and financial reasons. 
First, given their age and their relationship to the family situation, university students’ life experiences are
more likely to be comparable across countries than the experiences of randomly selected adults.
5  Second,
university students include a wide range of income and ethnic groups,
6 holding education level
approximately constant.  Third, university students are likely to be shaping future economic policies, or
voting for those that do.  University students also are likely to assume leadership positions in the business
community.  The fact that they are enrolled in university may signal a willingness to consider a wider
variety of options than the average citizen in problem solving situations.  In Russia’s transition economy,
this is particularly important.  Finally, in a university setting, the time and financial cost of distributing and
collecting the questionnaires is negligible.
By design, locations outside of Moscow were selected to get a more representative picture of
Russia than the capital city provides.  Indeed, Taganrog, where 75% of the Russian survey instruments
were administered, has been identified as the average or typical Soviet/Russian city (Grushin 1980,
                                                
5 The Shiller et al survey (1991) claims to be a randomly selected (albeit not representative) sample. 
Because citywide telephone directories did not exist in 1990, it is not clear from what population the random
selection took place.  Further complicating matters, less than half of the households had phones in 1990.  It is not
clear from the survey description whether more than one person per household was included in the sample.  Thus, the
results from the Shiller et al survey are presented here not so much to reflect popular support in Russia in 1990, and
whether there are differences over time, but rather to indicate what seems to be consistent across response patterns of
Russians with very different circumstances.
6 In Russia, the practice of providing free university education for all students meeting the entrance
requirements is no longer the norm.  Students enrolling in some departments (business-related, for example) are
required to pay for their university education, while students in other departments (physics, for example) attend free
of charge, or for a minimal fee.  To broaden the ethnic and income base of U.S. sample, the survey included both7
Rimashevskaya 1992, Chichilyimov 1999).
                                                                                                                                                            
public and private universities in three geographical regions.8
Altogether, the market opinion questionnaire was completed by more than 1,280 university
students in both Russia and the United States.   Questionnaires were distributed to students at Rostov State
University, Stavropol State University, Taganrog State University for Radio Engineering, and the Institute
for Teacher Training, also located in Taganrog, Russia, in May and August, 1999.  Of the 850
questionnaires distributed, some 746 were completed and returned,
7 for a response rate of 88%.  Overall,
classes in which the questionnaire was administered included students from the first to the fourth year of
the undergraduate program.  The average age of the Russian students participating in the project is 20
years old.
8  Sixty-three percent of the Russian respondents are women.
Just over 750 students attending Michigan State University, New York University, and the
University of Southern Mississippi were asked in March and April, 1999, to participate in the survey.  Of
these, 537 completed the questionnaire, for a response rate of 72%.
9  About half were undergraduates
currently enrolled in an economics class. The average age of the U.S. respondents is twenty-one.  Forty-
eight percent of the U.S. respondents are women.
Survey participants were presented with the same hypothetical situations involving different
dimensions of a market economy as those participating in the 1990 survey.  Table 1 provides a listing of
the variables defined in the Shiller et al (1991) survey that are included in this study, as well as the mean
values for both Russian and American respondents in the 1999 survey.  Where significant differences
                                                
7  With instructor permission, project coordinators took the questionnaires to classrooms, described the
project, requested students to complete and return the forms to the instructor, or to the main office.  Students were
informed verbally and in writing that their participation was voluntary, and that the results would be presented in
statistical form only; thus their anonymity and the confidentiality of their responses was guaranteed.  Students were
not asked to put their name anywhere on the questionnaire.  The questionnaires were not coded in any way to be able
to identify in which class the student received the questionnaire.  The only respondent-specific questions asked were
year born and gender.   
8 Some 2.1% of the sample was born prior to 1972.  While these would be considered non-traditional
students, they have not been excluded from the sample.  Moreover, the results presented in this paper do not vary
significantly by age.  That is, a dummy variable for age (OLD = 1 when respondent was born before 1975, and zero
otherwise) was included to see if responses of those born before 1975 was significantly different from those born
after 1975.  The coefficient on OLD (age) was not significant for the variables included in this analysis.
9 The procedure followed for distributing and collecting the questionnaire was the same in the U.S. and
Russia.9
between Russians and Americans emerge in response patterns, they are denoted by “Yes” in Table 1.  For
comparative purposes, Table 2 reports the percent of Russians and Americans in both the 1999 and 1990
surveys that responded affirmatively to each variable.  Most interesting to me was the fact that more
differences between Russians and Americans emerged in 1999 than in 1990.  Policy makers would benefit
from knowing if popular support for capitalism is concentrated only in Moscow. 
Since age and education level are held approximately constant by the nature of the 1999 sample, it
is possible to examine the extent to which there are significant gender differences in response patterns. 
Table 3 reports the mean response value by gender in Russia and the United States for the 1999 survey.
10 
Where significant differences emerge between men and women, they are noted in Table 3.  The last
column in Table 3 identifies the variables where gender differences are the same in both countries.  
Regression analysis is used to identify where differences between Russians and Americans, as well
as between men and women, are significant.  In particular, probit regressions, with dummy variables for
Russian and American men and women,
11 are used to evaluate whether differences in response patterns are
significant and/or gender related – that is, are the differences between Russian men and women the same
as differences between American men and women?  Given past and ongoing social, cultural, political and
economic differences between the two countries, there is no reason to expect a priori that gender
differences in Russia will match those in the United States. 
The following sections describe the exact questions asked and the results obtained.
II.  Private Property and Property Rights
It is not uncommon for the Russian popular press the carry articles discussing the possibility of re-
nationalizing major companies, especially in the energy sector, and especially before general elections. 
Perceptions which place a high probability on the likelihood of re-nationalization will not only undermine
                                                
10 This information is not provided in the Shiller et al survey results.
11 American men are used as the control group (omitted variable).10
investment activities but also the foundation upon which a market economy is built.
Do Russians view nationalization as a likely outcome (NATIONLZ)?  Respondents were asked:
How likely do you think it is that in the next few years the government will, in some way,
nationalize (that is, take over) most private business with little or no compensation to the owners?
 Is nationalization quite likely, possible, unlikely, or impossible?
Of the 731 Russians responding, 40% selected quite likely or possible.  This compares to 60% of the
respondents in the Shiller et al survey who viewed nationalization of cooperatives or leased enterprises as
quite likely or possible in 1990.
12   As seen in Table 2, more than 84% of the Americans in both surveys
selected impossible or unlikely, essentially ruling out the possibility, in their view, of nationalization. 
While it may be taken as good news that, five years after the end of Russia’s mass privatization program,
more than half of the participants in the 1999 survey felt that re-nationalization was unlikely, that such a
large percentage of the next generation of business leaders continued to select quite likely or possible does
not bode well for confidence in the institution of private property.  In both countries, in the 1999 survey,
women tended to view nationalization as more likely to occur than men, but the gender difference was not
statistically significant.
A second question related to confidence in the security of private property asked respondents
about the likelihood that government would take measures to confiscate their savings (TAKESAVE). 
When the question was first posed in the 1990 survey, government restrictions on withdrawals from bank
accounts had not yet been imposed, nor had central government frozen or confiscated foreign currency
deposits.  When the question was posed in 1999, families still were recovering from the ruble and dollar
losses associated with bank failures in Russia’s August 1998 financial crisis, in addition to having survived
numerous government policies which effectively reduced or eliminated savings in bank accounts (Krupp
and Linz 1997).  Thus, in response to the question:
How likely is it, from your point of view, that the government in the next few years will take
measures, in one way or another, to prevent those who have saved a great deal from making use
                                                
12 While the question did not specify cooperatives or leased enterprises, these were the only non-state-
owned organizational structures at the time (see Frydman et al 1993, Linz 1999).11
of their savings?  Is it quite likely, possible, unlikely, or impossible that the government will do
this?
it was somewhat surprising to find relatively more optimism about the relative security of their savings
among Russian respondents in 1999 than in 1990.  That is, while Russians were more likely than their
American counterparts to view the confiscation of savings as likely –  47% of the Russians selected quite
likely or possible, compared to 33% of the Americans –  Russians in 1999 were much less likely than those
in 1990 to respond affirmatively (see Table 2).  In the Shiller et al survey, 61% of the respondents selected
quite likely or possible in response to this question.  Quite surprising in the Shiller et al survey was the lack
of significant difference in the responses of Russians and Americans to this question, especially given the
relatively high percentage of affirmative responses.
A question that touches on property rights asked respondents to consider the following scenario
(CUTLINE):
You are standing in a long line to buy something.  You see that someone comes to the line and is
very distressed that the line is so long, saying he is in a great hurry and must make this purchase.
 A person at the front of the line offers to let him take her place in line for $10.  Would you be
annoyed at this deal, even though it won’t cause you to wait any longer?
As seen in Table 2, 60% of the Russians found the interruption harmless; a comparable percentage of
Americans responded similarly.  In the Shiller et al survey in 1990, when shortages of goods were still the
norm, nearly 70% of the Russian respondents were annoyed by the deal, compared to 44% of the
Americans; a significant difference in response patterns (see Table 2).  Interestingly, there were significant
gender difference in both Russia and American responses to this question in 1999 (see Table 3).
13  Women
in both countries were more likely than men to be annoyed by this transaction.
Private property and property rights are part of the foundation of a market economy.  That they are
viewed with some skepticism in Russia is certainly partial explanation for the substantial capital flight. 
That they are viewed with some skepticism in Russia may be undermining individuals’ willingness to
expend effort, plan, invest, and bear risk.  Without such activities, the likelihood is diminished that Russia
                                                
13 Information is not provided about the gender composition of the 1990 sample, or whether the results vary
by gender.12
will soon close the technological gap in the industries and sectors of the economy that were behind the
West at the beginning of the transition process.  The ability to compete with foreign-made products in
domestic markets, or to produce export-quality goods, becomes similarly diminished as the existing capital
stock depreciates.
III.  Popular Attitudes Toward Price Flexibility
Prices freely adjusting to surplus and shortage conditions represents a second basic tenet of a
market economy.  While resistance to price increases that were considered unfair has been documented in
survey results obtained in market economies (Kahneman et al 1986), popular support for market-based
pricing by cooperatives in the former Soviet economy is nowhere evident: survey results and wealth of
newspaper articles underscore widespread resistance prior to 1992 to prices adjusting to offset shortage
conditions (Jones and Moskoff 1991).  Since 1992, annual inflation rates (see Table 4) have put Russian
perceptions of price changes into a new dimension.
14 
Table 4: Annual Inflation Rates
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
rate
1,700%,    2,600%
838% ,  919%,    940%
215%, 257% , 307%, 320%  
125%, 131%, 198%, 230%
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999 (1
st Q)
rate
22%,     48%
11%,   15%
27%,    84%
102%
Source: Goskomtstat, Bloomberg Financial Markets, IMF, Central Bank of Russia, EBRD.
Given the rather traumatizing experience with overall price changes since 1992, how receptive are
Russians to price adjustments, and how much do they differ from their American counterparts in this
regard?  Several different scenarios explored.
Changes in demand conditions
                                                
14 Inflation rates reported in Table 4 include annual rates reported in a number of sources. All reporting
agencies are equally credible, thus all rates are included.13
How fair is it for price to increase in response to an increase in demand?  Respondents were asked
several questions that addressed this topic.  In the first scenario (PRICEUP), gender plays an important role
in explaining the results.
On a holiday, when there is a great demand for flowers, their prices usually go up.  Is it fair for
flower sellers to raise their prices like this?
While nearly 60% of the Russians responded affirmatively to this question, women were significantly less
likely to agree that such a price increase is fair (see Table 3).  In contrast, nearly 85% of the Americans
viewed the price increase as fair; there were no significant gender differences among American
respondents.  Indeed, the differences between Russians and Americans about the perceived fairness of this
price increase is largely driven by the differences between Russian men and women; Russian men are only
marginally more likely than Americans to say that the price increase is unfair.  In 1990, there was no
significant difference in the response patterns of Russians and Americans to this question (see Table 2).
As a follow up question, respondents were asked (LIMITPRI):
Should the government introduce limits on the increase in prices of flowers, even if it might
produce a shortage of flowers?
Nearly twice as many Russians (25%) as Americans (15%) said yes, although relatively speaking, there is
not much support for government restriction in this instance.  What support there is tends to come from
Russian women (see Table 3).  Support for government restriction was more prominent in the Soviet
economy.  As seen in Table 2, in the 1990 survey, 54% of the Russian respondents thought flower prices
should be restricted by government; only 28% of the Americans selected this option (Shiller et al 1991). 
Although the absolute magnitude differs in 1999 compared to 1990, the relative ratios in the response
patterns have remained roughly the same, suggesting perhaps an age effect that is influencing the two sets
of results:
15 younger respondents are more willing to allow prices to adjust to demand conditions.
Respondents were asked about the fairness of a price increase when demand conditions change in
                                                
15 The age composition of the 1990 sample is not reported, nor are any results reported to vary by age.  In
the 1999 sample, age is approximately the same for all participants.  When a dummy variable constructed for age
(OLD = 1 if born before 1972, zero otherwise) was included in the regression, it was not significant for any of the
variables included in this study.14
a second scenario (TABLEPRI):
A small factory produces kitchen tables and sells them at $200 each.  There is so much demand
for the tables that it cannot meet it fully.  The factory decides to raise the price of its tables by $20,
when there is no change in the cost of producing tables.  Is this fair?  
Over half of the Russians thought such a price increase was fair (54%), compared to 81% of the Americans
(see Table 2).  Interestingly enough, in the 1990 survey, only about one-third of the Russian and American
respondents found the price increase fair.  While still much less likely than their American counterparts to
find fairness in price increases, that more than half of the Russian participants in the 1999 survey
responded affirmatively might be taken as a positive development.
Like the flower scenario, a follow up question was asked (RAISEPRI):  Apart from fairness,
should the factory have the right to raise the price in this situation?  At least two-thirds (68%) of the
Russians said yes; 94% of the Americans responded affirmatively.  In the 1990 survey, no significant
difference in response patterns of Russians and Americans emerged: just under 60% thought the furniture
factory should have the right to raise price under these conditions (see Table 2).  Unlike the flower
scenario, Russian women in 1999 did not differ significantly from men in their response pattern.
A third scenario was used to gauge popular support for prices responding to changing demand
conditions (RAISRENT).  Respondents were asked: 
A new railway line makes travel between city and summer homes positioned along this rail line
substantially easier.  Accordingly, summer homes along this railway line become more desirable. 
Is it fair if rents are raised on summer homes there?  
As seen in Table 2, 71% of the Russians responded affirmatively, while 85% of the Americans thought
such a price increase was fair.  As in the first scenario, Russian women were least likely to find the price
increase fair (see Table 3).  In the 1990 survey, there was virtually no difference in the response patterns of
Russians and Americans:  about 60% of those responding thought that in this situation raising rents was
fair (see Table 2).
In these three scenarios, where price increases are associated with changing demand conditions, at15
least half of the Russians find the situation fair, despite the fact that women, comprising more than half of
the Russian sample, were least likely to agree.  With regard to popular support for the market, is the glass
half empty or half full?  The fact that the participants represent the next wave of business leaders and
consumers, and that they are located well beyond the Moscow environment, may suggest a “half full”
interpretation to the results.
Rationing  
Do Russians prefer rationing to price increases when demand conditions exceed supply? 
Respondents were asked (LIMITGAS):    
Suppose that the government wishes to reduce consumption of gasoline. They propose two
methods of attaining this goal.  First, the government could prohibit gas stations from selling, for
example, more than five gallons to one person.  Second, the government could put a tax on
gasoline, and the prices of gasoline would go up.  From your point of view, which of these
methods is better?  
Twice as many Russians (51%) preferred rationing as Americans (25%) in 1999; Russian women were
especially strong in their preference of rationing over a price increase (tax).  In the 1990 survey, 43% of the
Russians and 36% of the Americans selected rationing over a price increase (see Table 2).
Causes of price increases
High prices resulting from speculative activities carried not only a negative connotation in the
former Soviet economy, but also a jail term.  It may be that the Soviet legacy of punishing those who try to
take advantage of a shortage situation continues to affect opinions in Russia’s transition economy.  To
examine in more detail whether Russians might be linking price increases to speculative behavior,
respondents were asked about possible causes of a price increase: government intervention (GOVT),
changes in supply or demand conditions (HARVEST), speculative behavior (SPECULAT).
If the price of coffee on the world market suddenly increased by 30 percent, what do you think is
likely to be the blame? 
Interventions of some
government?
Only 28% of the Russians surveyed responded affirmatively to this option; nearly 50% of the Americans16
selected government intervention as a possible explanation for the price increase.
16  There were no
significant gender differences in response patterns related to this option.
If the price of coffee on the world market suddenly increased by 30 percent, what do you think is
likely to be the blame? Such things as bad harvest in Brazil or unexpected changes in demand?
                                                
16 Respondents were given a chance to select Yes or No for each of the three options given to this question. 
Thus, the sum of the affirmative responses is more than 100%.  In the Shiller et al survey, respondents could select
only one option.  Less than 20% of the respondents in the Russian and American samples selected government
intervention (17% and 13%, respectively).
More than two-thirds (70%) of the Russians participating in this survey thought that changes in supply or
demand conditions would be the most likely cause of the price increase; 92% of the Americans selected
this option.  As seen in Table 2, in the 1990 survey, 51% of the Russians and 36% of the Americans
responded correspondingly.  This is one of the few instances where gender differences, albeit marginal,
emerge in American response patterns, but not in Russian responses.  American women participating in the
1999 survey were more likely than their male counterparts to select this option (see Table 3).
Respondents were given a third option for explaining the price increase:
If the price of coffee on the world market suddenly increased by 30 percent, what do you think is
likely to be the blame? Speculators’ efforts to raise prices?
Russian respondents were much more likely than their American counterparts to view speculators’ efforts as
the source of price increases: 56% to 39%, respectively.  The opposite result holds in the 1990 survey: 32% of
the Russians and 51% of the Americans cited speculators as the likely cause of the price increase (see Table 2).
Perhaps most striking in these results is the fact that Russian women appear quite hostile toward free-
market pricing.  In all pricing questions asked, there are significant differences between Russian and
American response patterns; in most cases, these are driven by gender differences in Russia that are not
matched in the United States.  Second, while more differences appear in 1999 than in 1990 – in the 1990
survey, for two-thirds of these same questions, there were no significant differences between Russian and17
American response patterns – the fact that a somewhat greater percentage of the Russian respondents tend to
be in favor of flexible pricing may be taken as a sign of growing popular support.  That they are still much
less likely than their American counterparts to support flexible prices, however, tends to suggest that a
groundswell of popular support for this dimension of a market economy has not been pervasive in Russia.
IV.  Popular Attitudes Toward Payment for Services Rendered
According to Shiller et al (1991, p. 392), “the essence of a market system is the ability of persons to
secure the things they want by the voluntary and unrestricted exchange of money.”  Does the Soviet legacy of
acquiring goods and services by connections (blat) continue to influence opinions related to the payment for
services rendered in the Russian transition economy?
17  Respondents were asked whether they would charge
interest on a loan to a friend (CHGINTST): 
Suppose you have agreed to lend a friend some money for six months, so that he will not miss a good
opportunity to buy a summer home.  Suppose banks are offering interest rates of 3 percent per year. 
Would you charge your friend interest on the loan? 
Nearly 25% of the Russian participating in this survey said yes; 27% of the American respondents answered
in the affirmative.  In the 1990 survey, there were significant differences in response patterns: “about five
times as many U.S. respondents answered ‘yes,’ compared to their Soviet counterparts ... although most
people in both countries said they would not charge a friend interest” (Shiller et al 1991, p. 393).  Indeed,
even though a significantly greater proportion of Russians responded affirmatively in 1999 (24%)  than in
1990 (6%), it is still the case that more than three-quarters of those who answered the question in 1999 would
not charge interest on a loan to a friend (see Table 2).  It could be that Russians’ experience with interest rates
in double and triple digits makes single-digit rates somewhat passee. 
In a second question, which abstracts from relative differences in banking institutions and interest
                                                
17 In a survey conducted in the early 1980s of more than 3,000 Soviet emigrants to the United States, 37%
reported using blat or protektsia in making contacts (to get things done); 45% reported using blat in making
purchases in state stores; 30% reported relying on blat in obtaining their job. Blat or protektsia also was considered
important in career advance / job promotion decisions.  Soviet Interview Project General Surveys Codebook (1988).
 For further discussion, see Millar (1987).18
rates across countries, respondents were asked about people paying for their share of expenses (SETTLE):
If you went on a vacation with friends and there were a lot of shared expenses, would there be a
careful accounting of who spent what and a settling of accounts afterwards?
Just under one-third of the Russians said yes, compared to nearly half (48%) of the Americans (see Table 2). 
Russians’ reluctance, compared to their American counterparts, to undertake a careful expenditure accounting
also is evident in the 1990 survey results: 70% of the Russian respondents said “no;” only 53% of the
Americans responded negatively.  While no gender differences are reported in the 1990 survey results, in this
instance in the 1999 survey, gender differences in Russia and the U.S. are significant and identical: women
are more likely than men to want to settle the accounts (see Table 3). 
Russians appear to place less importance than Americans on the payment for services rendered if
friends are involved.  If this attitude is more widely applied, to transactions which involve acquaintances, for
example, it could serve to undermine successful market operations.  Russians living outside of Moscow, given
residence restrictions and housing shortages in the Soviet economy, typically did not move from one region to
another.
18  This is especially true for Russians living in formerly “closed” regions – those dominated by
defense-related production (Gaddy 1996).  Moreover, in the Soviet economy where many goods were
routinely unavailable, Russians developed widespread social and kinship networks to obtain deficit
commodities.  Thus several generations of extended families, where mobility is low between cities and
tradition underscores the importance of connections,
19 tend to live in one city in order to turn to each other for
help when needed.  The lack of mobility for several generations and the widespread use of blat in the Russian
economy (Ledeneva 1998), raises the probability that any given transaction will involve an acquaintance.
V.  Performance-based Pay and Rewarding Hard Work
                                                
18 Exceptions relate to higher education and post-education job assignments, with Moscow acting as a
magnet, as well as to population relocation policies that were implemented during Stalin’s regime.
19 Economic necessity appears to have replaced tradition in the Russian economy in terms of reliance on
family and friends for assistance when wages are not paid, or jobs are lost, or individuals/families find themselves in
unsustainable conditions (UNDP 1998).19
Do Russians support reward for hard work?  In response to the question (PBASEPAY):  Do you think
that people work better if their pay is directly tied to the quantity and quality of their work? the vast majority,
92%, of Russians responded affirmatively.  The mean response varied little by country or gender.  Russians
were equally supportive as Americans of a proposal to pay people with high skills or those who work harder
an amount of money three times greater than the average.  That is, when asked (PRODINC):
Suppose the government wants to undertake a reform to improve the productivity of the economy.  As
a result, everyone will be better off, but the improvement in life will not affect people equally.  A
million people (people who respond energetically to the incentives in the plan and people with
certain skills) will see their incomes triple, while everyone else will see only a tiny income increase,
about 1 percent.  Would you support the plan?
just over 60% of the Russians and Americans responded affirmatively (see Table 2).  This result is
comparable to that found by Shiller et al in 1990 – of the 114 Russians who responded to the question, 55%
supported the proposal; only 38% of the Americans responding did so.  Albeit too small to be statistically
significant, differences in the 1999 survey results appear to be driven by the fact that American women tend
not to support the proposal. 
Should people be allowed to control the fruits of their labor?  Respondents were asked about their
rights to pass their wealth on to their children (INHERTAX):
In your opinion, what inheritance tax rate for really wealthy people do you think we should have?
 A tax rate of 0 percent means that they can pass all of their wealth to their children, making them
as rich as their parents.  A rate of 50% means that they can pass half of their wealth to their
children.  A rate of 100 percent means that they can pass none at all to their children.  Select a
rate from 0-100%
Russians responded no differently than their American counterparts: inherited wealth should be taxed at a
rate of 18 percent (see Tables 2 and 3).   In the Shiller et al survey, there too was no difference between
responses of Russians (39%) and Americans (37%), although the tax rate suggested by both was more than
double that emerging from this survey.  To the extent that university students may view themselves as the
recipient of parental bequests, it is not surprising that the tax rate they select is relatively low. 
VI.  Profit Motive and Rewards to Successful Business
A major theme in transition lore are the gains associated with legalizing and facilitating20
entrepreneurial activities that in socialist times received harsh punishment.  No one questioned the
existence of entrepreneurial skill in the former Soviet economy – one need only consider the size of the
second economy, as well as the rapid expansion of cooperatives in the mid-1980s, to be quite confident
that the incidence of entrepreneurism was widespread (Gregory and Stuart 1990, Grossman 1990, Jones
and Moskoff 1991, Linz 1988, O’Hern 1980, Schroeder and Greenslade 1979).  Indeed, a survey of more
than 3,000 Soviet emigrants to the United States in the mid-1980s (Millar 1987) indicated that nearly two
out of every ten adults in the Soviet economy earned income by participating in the second economy; more
than half of the respondents (54%) reported routinely making purchases in the second economy (na levo).
20
 Moreover, managers of Soviet manufacturing plants in heavy industry were given relatively high rankings
by the emigrants participating in the survey in terms of perceived influence and competency.
                                                
20 These same data do not support the proposition that, prior to perestroika, there was a groundswell of
support for private enterprise in the Soviet economy, however.
Do Russians view profit motive and the rewards to successful business in a positive light? 
Respondents were asked:
Suppose that as a result of successful business dealings you unexpectedly become rich.  How do
you imagine it would be received by your relatives at a holiday family gathering?  Would they
congratulate you and show great interest, or would they be judgmental and contemptuous.
(A) They would show interest, would congratulate.
(B) They would be judgmental and contemptuous.
There are no significant differences in response patterns to the first question (CONGRAT): 95% of the
Russians and Americans participating in this survey said “yes.”  Nearly twice as many Americans (11%) as
Russians (5%) said “yes” to the second question (JUDGE) in 1999, hence the significant difference
identified in Table 2.  Like the 1990 results, the vast majority of respondents selected “no.” 
However, responses to a second question (HONEST):
Do you think that those who try to make a lot of money will often turn out to be not very honest
people?
do indicate significant differences between Russians’ and Americans’ perceptions: three-quarters of the21
Russians agreed with the statement, compared to 34% of the Americans (see Table 2).  The contrast in the
Russian responses between these two questions suggests that while survey participants think that family
members would congratulate them for their successful business activities, they also believe that the
community at large would tend to think their success was dishonestly gained.  This perception is not
unwarranted.  Given the reality of Russia’s tax codes and legal structure, it is hard to find examples of
successful business dealings that do not entail dishonest components (Linz and Krueger 1998).  
The success of Russia’s transition will depend in large part on the pool of talent entering the ranks
of the business community.  It hardly needs saying that successful companies are one of the main pillars of
a market economy.  Yet, in Russia, given the obstacles associated with under-developed institutions and
infrastructure, as well as those imposed by a largely inappropriate capital stock and widespread corruption,
the hurdles individuals must overcome to establish and operate a successful business are not trivial.  Is this
an occupation to which young Russians aspire?  How much different are Russian business people than the
average citizen?  Are they viewed in a negative way?  While these questions were not asked, two questions
were asked which permit some inference about how business people are viewed in Russia. 
Do you think that it is likely to be difficult to make friends with people who have their own
business (privately-owned, or small corporation) and are trying to make a profit?
Do you think that if you worked independently today as a businessperson and received profit, that
your friends and acquaintances would respect you less and not treat you as you deserve?
Significant differences are evident for both questions (see Table 2).  Nearly five times as many Russians
(49%) as Americans (10%) said “yes” to the first question (OWNBIZ); almost twice as many Russians as
Americans (15% and 9%, respectively) responded positively to the second question (DESERVE).  These
same differences were also reported in the 1990 survey (Shiller et al 1991).  While it is the case that the
majority of survey participants would not find it difficult to make friends with business people and would
expect to be treated well by their friends if they join ranks with the business community, the negative
connotation associated with business is Russia in strikingly evident, and has remained so for nearly a
decade.22
VII.  Popular Attitudes Toward Investment
Quite unlike the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia continues to struggle
with chaotic economic conditions.  How willing are Russians to invest in the future?  Survey participants
were asked (INVEST):
Suppose that a group of your friends is starting a business that you think is very risky and could
fail, but might also make investors in that business rich.  Would you be tempted to invest a
substantial portion of your savings in it?
As seen in Table 2, Russians responded no differently than their American counterparts: about 40% would
be tempted to invest their savings in the proposed business venture.  This perhaps is the most positive
result emerging from these survey data – young Russians, despite rather difficult economic conditions and
facing rather large obstacles, are no less likely to consider investment options than young Americans.
VIII.  Conclusions
Are Russians ready for capitalism?  Survey data collected from more than 1,280 university
students in Russia and the United States suggest that Russians view market foundations and market
outcomes much differently than their American counterparts.  In comparison to the survey done in Moscow
and New York in 1990, from which the questions used here were drawn, more significant differences
emerge in the 1999 response patterns (see Table 2).  This is somewhat surprising, given the composition of
the 1999 sample which holds age and education level approximately constant across countries.  From the
policy makers’ perspective, this outcome may be somewhat distressing – after nearly a decade of transition
from plan to market, there does not appear to be among the young Russians living outside of Moscow a
widespread acceptance of market outcomes.  In particular, Russian women tend to view standard market
outcomes as unfair.  Moreover, young Russians attach a relatively high probability to the prospect of the
government confiscating their property and/or savings.
These survey data highlight gender differences in Russia that account for many of the differences
between Russians and Americans (see Table 3).   That is, the fact that gender differences in Russia are not23
like gender differences (or lack thereof) in the United States frequently is the explanation for differences in
response patterns across countries.  Ignoring this information is likely to undermine the success of
implementing policies to support market foundations and market outcomes in Russia.    24
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